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DOES PRIVATE AND COST-PRICED HIGHER EDUCATION
PRODUCE POOR QUALITY?
AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS BASED ON LABOUR MARKET SUCCESS
INDICATORS OF  HUNGARIAN HIGHER-EDUCATION GRADUATES
PÉTER GALASI AND JÚLIA VARGA
Abstract
Since the beginning of the transition, Hungarian higher education has
been undergoing continuous transformation. The number of students in
higher education more than doubled, and this was accompanied by the
appearance of newly founded church-run and private higher education
institutions and newly established cost-priced places. The paper
focuses on the potential negative effects private and cost-priced higher
education might have on the quality of the education and students by
making use of labour market success indicators (wages and labour
market status) with the help of multivariate estimation techniques. A
unique data set, the Second Fidév Survey, is used which provides
information about the September 2000 labour market situation of
persons graduated from higher education in 1999. The results suggest
that  education at cost-priced, state funded places and private higher
education institutions provides essentially the same level of knowledge
or produces the same educational quality as measured by wages. No
negative effect has been detected as for the labour market status of ex-
students. Students from cost-priced places and private institutions
experience the same unemployment probability, whereas the overall
employment probability of students graduated from cost-priced places
is higher than that of persons studied at state-funded places. One can
conclude that although the opportunity of establishing more and more
cost-priced places might have been advantageous for higher education
institutions so as to increase their revenues, they have shown some self-
restraint in this respect, and there is no sign that the increase in cost-
priced places has led to lower quality workers.
2RONTJA-E A MINŐSÉGET A MAGÁN ÉS ÖNKÖLTSÉGES
FELSŐOKTATÁS?
A FELSŐOKTATÁSBÓL KILÉPŐ HALLGATÓK MUNKAERŐ-PIACI
SIKERMUTATÓINAK EMPIRIKUS ELEMZÉSE
GALASI PÉTER – VARGA JÚLIA
Összefoglaló
A rendszerváltozás óta a magyar felsőoktatást szüntelen átalakulás
jellemzi: a  hallgatók létszáma több, mint kétszeresére nőtt, új egyházi és
magán felsőoktatási intézmények alakultak, gyorsan emelkedett az
önköltséges helyek száma. A tanulmány a magán- és az önköltséges
felsőoktatásnak a felsőoktatás és a diákok minőségére gyakorolt
potenciálisan negatív hatásával foglalkozik munkaerő-piaci sikermutatók
(bér és munkaerő-piaci státusz) segítségével, többváltozós becslési
eljárások felhasználásával. Egy egyedülálló adatbázist, a második FIDÉV
felvétel adatait használjuk, amely információkat tartalmaz az 1999-ben a
felsőoktatás nappali tagozatán végzett személyek 2000. szeptemberi
munkaerő-piaci helyzetéről. A vizsgálódás eredményei arra utalnak, hogy
az önköltséges, az államilag finanszírozott képzés, valamint a magán
felsőoktatási intézmények lényegében egyforma színvonalú tudást, illetve
oktatási minőséget nyújtanak, ha a tudást/minőséget a bérrel mérjük. Nem
mutathatók ki negatív hatások akkor sem, ha a munkaerő-piaci státuszt
vizsgáljuk. Az önköltséges helyeken, illetve magán intézményekben végzett
volt hallgatók munkanélkülivé válásának valószínűsége nagyjából azonos,
illetve az önköltséges helyeken végzett volt hallgatók elhelyezkedési
valószínűsége magasabb, mint az államilag finanszírozott helyeken
végzetteké. A kutatásból adódó legfontosabb következtetés: noha az
intézmények számára bevételeik emelése céljából előnyös lehet az
önköltséges helyek számának növelése, magatartásukat ebben a
tekintetben valamelyes visszafogottság jellemzi, s ezért nincs jele annak,
hogy az önköltséges helyek számának növekedése rontotta volna a
kibocsátás munkaerő-piaci minőségét.
31.1. INTRODUCTION
The paper is intended to contribute to the debate about how rapid growth
of students in higher education, increases in the number of students
covering full cost of their education  and the appearance of private
institutions might affect education and student quality as measured by
labour market success indicators. In Section 2, we present a description of
recent changes in the Hungarian higher education system. Then with using
some indicators for trends on the Hungarian labour market and examining
admission criteria of different higher education institutions we look for
signs that support or reject the hypothesis of devaluation of higher
education diplomas. Finally we briefly discuss the relationship of labour
market status and wages to types of higher education institutions, and ways
of funding studies. Section 3 contains a description of our data source, the
Second FIDÉV Survey and some variables. In Section 4 our estimation
strategy is discussed, Section 5 presents the results of the estimations.
Section 6 concludes.
2.2. THE PROBLEM
Since the beginning of the transition, Hungarian higher education has been
undergoing continuous transformation. The expansion and restructuring of
higher education have become top priority for the succeeding
governments. During the past ten years the number of students in higher
education more than doubled. Though potential students’ demand for
higher education has also increased considerably there is still over-demand
for higher education places. Since the second half of the ’90s the system of
Hungarian higher education has comprised public, church-run and private
higher education institutions. In addition to state-funded places all the
institutions may have cost-price places meaning that students have to cover
the whole costs of their education. Private higher education is then a two-
fold term in Hungary. First, non-public institutions might be considered
private although some of their places are state-funded. Second, cost-priced
places might be regarded as private for students covering the full costs.  As
mentioned before a considerable part of places in private institutions are
4state-funded, that is the institutions are given the same sums public
institutions get for the same type and level of education.
Currently there are 17 public universities, 11 public colleges, 9 private
colleges and 26 church-run education institutions in Hungary. Most of the
church-run institutions provide only theological courses, out of the 26 only
two church-run universities and two colleges have degree programmes in
other fields of study: law, teacher training and humanities. Private
institutions are all colleges; they provide courses finishing with a BA
degree. Currently private colleges provide courses only in few subject
areas (for example business-management, and information technology).
The rapid growth of the number of students and the appearance of new
private institutions raise the question of quality especially for the newly
founded private institutions and cost-priced places. The research in this
paper focuses on the quality of private and non-private higher education.
The quality is interpreted in a human capital framework (Becker 1975,
Mincer 1974), and measured by labour market success indicators (wages
and labour market status).
Wage is here an indicator of the return to human capital the potential
worker invested in by his/her schooling. In a simple beckerian setting the
return depends on several labour-market- supply- and demand-side factors.
On the supply side one can distinguish at least three of them. The first is
the amount of schooling, traditionally measured by classes completed or
highest degree obtained; the more classes the individual completed and/or
the higher his/her degree is s/he will have higher amounts of human capital
resulting in higher wages. The second is the quality of education provided
by the educational institutions s/he attended; the better the school s/he
attends the higher his/her human capital accumulation will be in the course
of studies leading to higher wages on the labour market, ceteris paribus,
that is, at given level of schooling. The third one is the earnings potential
or labour market ability of the potential worker; higher earnings potential
implies higher productivity and produces higher wages at a given level of
education and given school quality. It is clear then that more classes or
higher degrees might be associated with lower wages if the quality of
education is low, or that the same number of classes and/or quality of
education might result in different wages if individuals differ in their
earnings potential. As for our cost-priced places/ private institutions
problem this implies that – at given levels of education completed – even if
cost-priced places and/or private institutions provide an education of lower
quality the wage of their students might be higher if students with higher
earnings potential choose cost-priced places or private institutions.
5It is important to note, however, that in a life-time-income-present-value
maximisation framework the schooling decision is solely directed by the
relative expected wage gain and relative costs of attending a school. Then
obtaining a higher degree might be advantageous for the potential worker
even if the quality of education is deteriorating over time if the wage gain
attainable by the higher degree is higher than the costs. This means that
deteriorating educational quality might be coupled with increases in the
number of applicants for the given school.
Finally, in a slightly more complex human capital setting where the
number of applicants to be admitted is restricted, that is, where life-cycle
wage-gain and admission probability are combined one can show that the
quality of a cost-priced higher education diploma as measured by the wage
gain attainable might be higher or lower than that of a state-funded one.
When a potential higher education student  makes his/her enrolment
decision, assuming that s/he maximises the present value of his/her life-
time income, and – for simplicity – assuming that s/he will be admitted to a
higher education institution at the given probability of admission and the
decision solely concerns the choice of a cost-priced or state-funded place,
he/she will choose a cost-priced place if the present value of the lifetime
wage gain due to the cost-priced diploma exceeds the additional costs of
obtaining a diploma at a cost-priced place. She will choose a cost-priced
place (institution) if the following inequality holds:
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where CCP and CSF are the costs of a cost-priced and state-funded place for
the potential student, respectively, WCP  and WSF are the expected (annual)
wage obtainable by graduating form a cost-priced or state-funded places, p
denotes the probability of admission to a state-funded place, t is life-cycle
time, the individual spends k-1 time periods on studies and k to T time
periods on the labour market (with a final period of time T), and i is the
individual’s discount rate.
By assumption SFCP CC > , thus the potential student would choose a cost-
priced place if SFCP pWWp >− )1( ; therefore the decision will depend on the
wages and the admission probabilities associated with the two kinds of
places. p is a function of the criteria of admission (entry exams, admission
restrictions in terms of the number of students to be admitted, entry scores,
6etc). If the criteria of admission are much stricter for state funded than
cost-priced places (1 - p > p) then the student might end up with a choice
CPSF WW > . If the criteria of admission do not differ much or do not differ
at all then choosing a cost-priced place will result in SFCP WW > . The result
is then that stricter admission criteria for state-funded places make cost-
priced places attractive even if the quality of its education and the expected
relative wage is low, with applying similar criteria of admission for both
kind of places results in choosing cost-priced places if the quality of
education at the cost-priced place is high therefore the wage gain
attributable to cost-priced education is considerable. This can easily be
extended to the decision on attending private and non-private institutions
and the choice between individual institutions, as well.
Note, however, that p might be also influenced by the potential student’s
ability so at given admission criteria students with heterogeneous abilities
may differ as for the value of their ps. The better the student’s ability the
higher is his/her probability to be accepted at a state funded place at given
admission criteria. In addition, if students are heterogeneous in terms of
earnings potential then they might face different wage gains at given
quality of education provided by the institution they choose. Finally, it is
worth noting that since i might reflect either subjective time preference or
access to funds, potential students may have different i values leading to
different results in choosing the institution to study in.
As for the other labour market success indicator, labour market status is
not as simply interpretable as the wage. We will distinguish three labour
market states: employee, unemployed, full-time student. Employment
might reflect better quality or/and higher earnings potential, but also
depends on the reservation wages of potential workers. As regards our
cost-priced/private institution problem it might also reflect the effect of
differences in direct costs of education. Since the direct cost of cost-priced
places and private institutions is much higher than that of state-funded
ones, it might be that the willingness of would-be workers graduated from
cost-priced places or private institutions is stronger to become employed
for their stronger motivation of collecting the premia of their more costly
education. Unemployment is a less unambiguous quality indicator because
the unemployed is willing to enter the labour market but s/he does not find
an acceptable job offer. Therefore, if his/her reservation wage is not lower
than the going market wage, s/he might be unemployed from demand-side
quality considerations. But if the reservation wage of the potential worker
is higher than the going market wage, it is unclear whether lower earnings
potential and/or education quality play a role in the unemployment s/he
7experiences. Remaining a full-time student after graduating from a higher
education institution is also hard to interpret unambiguously. It might be
motivated by fear from unemployment or further human capital investment
on the part of the graduate. But it might result from differences in
education costs, as well. As regards our private institutions or cost-priced
place problem where the differences in the cost of education are important,
students graduated from cost-priced places or private institutions might be
less willing to study further than those studied at state-funded places
because they might consider the cost of their education high and thus more
willing to enter the labour market so as to benefit from their human capital
investments.
In Hungary several factors may cause differences in the quality of private
and non-private diplomas, state-funded or cost-priced places. High demand
for higher education on the part of the potential students might be coupled
with lowering standards of entry on the part of institutions. This would
lead to milder criteria of admission to cost-priced places and/or to private
institutions since a cost-priced student is tantamount to higher revenues to
the institution, and the number of students to be admitted to cost-price
places are not regulated, whereas the number of state-funded places are
fixed by the Ministry of Education on an annual basis. Some indicators
suggest that lower standards of screening might be true of private
institutions and cost-priced places. First in certain private institutions there
are no entrance exams. Second the scores of admission to cost-priced
places are usually lower than to state-funded places for the same higher-
education institutions and the same type of education. In 1999 it was by
some six per cent lower.1 In addition, the ratio of the number of students
admitted to the number of applicants is higher for cost-price places than for
state-funded places. On average 17 per cent of the applicants were
admitted to state-funded whereas the value of the same indicator was 26
per cent for cost-priced places in 1999.2
Weaker admission criteria might imply lower quality students and lower
quality education, and both might lead to lower wages. Acquiring a lower
quality higher education diploma, however, might be advantageous for the
potential student from pure human capital considerations if the relative
wage gain of young employees with a higher education degree has been
increasing as compared their wages to the wages young employees with
high school diploma might obtain. If this is so, being young with a higher
                                           
1 This figure comes from the data base of the Higher Education Admission Office and concerns the
admission scores of  the 1999/2000 school year.
2 Source of data is the same as in footnote 1
8education diploma leads to increasing wage gains even when the quality of
diploma is relatively poor. Some indicators show that this might be the
case in Hungary during the ’90s. The ratio of monthly wages of young (20-
34 years old) workers with higher education diploma to young workers
with high school diploma has been continuously increasing (see Figure 1).
The wage gain due to higher education diploma as compared to a high
school diploma has been doubled over the period in consideration, from
about 36 per cent to 70 per cent. This might be related to the restructuring
of the Hungarian economy due to its transitional period.
Lower labour market quality and cost-priced places or private institutions
do not necessarily go hand in hand, however. As we have seen even if the
quality of education is worse at these institutions/places and/or their
criteria of admission are less strict, if the earnings potential (ability,
productivity) of their students is better than that of persons graduated from
state-funded places/state-run institutions, then the labour market quality of
their students might be better in terms of either wages or employment
probability. Second, since the direct cost of obtaining a higher education
diploma at a cost-priced place is much higher than at a state-funded one,
students might expect higher wage gain at higher costs so the quality of
education provided to cost-priced students must be better in order to be
attractive for potential students and the diploma must produce higher
wages and/or better chances of employment, ceteris paribus, that is at a
given earnings potential.
3.3. DATA
The data we will make use of come from the Second Young Higher-
Education Graduates Survey conducted by the FIDÉV Research Group at
the Department of Human Resources of Budapest University of Economics
and Public Administration, and financed by the Hungarian Ministry of
Education. The aim of these surveys was to analyse the labour market
trajectories of youth graduated from higher-education institutions. The
population of the Second Survey consists of persons graduated from day
classes of public and private universities and colleges in 1999, all of them
having been full-time students. All such persons have received a short
postal questionnaire between 1 May and 10 June 2001. The overall
response rate was 22,8% (N. 5783). Since the structure of the sample
9differs from that of the population we will use weighted data. The
questionnaire has requested information on the type of high school and
university/college education and the September 2000 labour market
characteristics of graduates.
The composition and the size of the sample allow us to compare the labour
market success of private and non-private students/institutions/di-plomas.
About one-tenth of the respondents graduated form cost-priced places, the
proportion attended private colleges, or church-run institutions is 5 and 3
per cent, respectively. About 18 per cent of those attended church-run
institutions graduated from cost-priced places and the same proportion is
7,4 per cent among state-run institutions’ graduates.3
On average, out of every ten graduates six have a BA and four an MA
degree. Cost-priced places, however, provide mainly BA degree; the
proportion of BA diploma holders among those occupied cost-priced
places is 85 per cent. All the respondents graduated form private
institutions have BA degree, and this holds true of more than 80 per cent
for those attended church-run institutions.
The composition of graduates by types of education differs by institutions.
Private institutions provide diploma mainly in informatics and business –
two highly demanded specialisations on the labour market, the share of
private education in informatics is important (46,4 %). Church-run
institutions’ diploma holders have specialised mostly in arts and
humanities; they are overrepresented in social sciences as most of them
have a social worker specialisation.
For some specialisations the number of graduates from cost-priced places
exceeds the overall 12 per cent. These are informatics, business, teaching
(BA), technical education.
As for our labour market success indicators we consider the labour market
status and the monthly net (after tax) wage. Four labour market states are
distinguished: employee (and self-employed), unemployed, full-time
student, other inactive. In a human capital setting we expect more
employees, less unemployed, full-time students and other inactives among
cost-priced students since – ceteris paribus – they have higher education
costs therefore at given wage levels they need more time on the labour
market to make their extra investment profitable.
                                           
3 Note that there are very few cases at state-funded places in private institutions. These
are omitted from the analysis.
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Among the respondents graduated from private institutions the proportion
of employees is higher and those of other labour market states are lower
than the sample average. Persons who attended church-run institutions are
worse off in terms of high unemployment and the proportion of other
inactives are also high. The number of full-time students exceeds 9 per
cent among state-run institutions’ graduates whereas this value is 6 per
cent for the whole sample.
The proportion of employees is higher and that of full-time students lower
for cost-priced students but state-funded and cost-priced education
produces similar levels of unemployment and about the same number of
other inactives.
As for the other labour market success indicator, the average monthly net
wage of the workers in the sample was HUF 66 thousand. This is 18 per
cent higher than the average monthly wage observed in September 1999
for persons graduated from higher education institutions in 1998 (Galasi
and Timár and Varga, 2000), and 16,5 per cent higher than that of the
average Hungarian worker in 2000 (Fazekas 2001, Table 7.1). Obtaining a
degree at cost-priced places leads to a 9 per cent high wage gain (cost-
priced places: HUF 71 thousand, state-funded places: HUF 65 thousand)
and that a private institutions’ diploma implies 31 per cent higher wages
than that from a state-run institution. We can see that workers with
diploma from a church-run institution earn much less (HUF 43 thousand)
than those graduated from a state-run one. Differences in wages, however,
might be due to differences in specialisation structure of state-funded and
cost-priced places or private, state- and church-run institutions.
4.4. ESTIMATION STRATEGY
We have to single out the "pure" cost-priced or private education effects
either on the labour market status or the wage of respondents. For this
reason we will apply multivariate regression techniques that allow us to
control for relevant factors others than this effect.
As regards the labour market status of the respondents first we will run
logits with a dichotomous dependent variable – the respondent is employed
or not-employed – since employment is the most important outcome as for
the labour market success of diploma holders or the labour market value of
11
diplomas. Then multinomial logits will be run with using the four-outcome
classification used in the previous section.
We have considered several specifications as for the key explanatory
variable(s) that would capture the private/cost-priced education effect(s).
First, a single cost-priced dummy will be inserted into the equation that is
we will distinguish cost-priced and state-funded places/dummies (Model
1). That would make it possible to analyse whether cost-priced places have
an impact on labour market participation probability as compared to state-
funded places. Second, we will use three dummies by distinguishing cost-
price students in state-run, church-run and private institutions that might
provide information about whether cost-priced places/students would
differ by diploma-issuing institutions in terms of labour market
participation probabilities (Model 2). Finally with the help of five dummy
variables we will try to assess whether the three individual private
institutions in our sample differ from one another as for the labour market
participation probabilities of their students (Model 3).
Other explanatory variables that might affect labour market participation
probability will be used, as well. Level of education (BA or MA) would be
such a variable by having an effect on labour market participation
independently of whether the respondent graduated from cost-priced or
state-funded places, state-, church-run or private institution. It will be
represented by a dummy variable (BA degree = 0, MA degree = 1). In-
school labour market experience is also a promising candidate since it
would result in – ceteris paribus – more human capital that might be
related to labour market participation (Light 2001). This effect will also be
captured by a dummy variable (0 = not worked regularly for payment
during the studies, 1 = regularly worked for payment during the studies).
Finally, a series of type of education/specialisation dummies is intended to
control for heterogeneity of qualifications that might result in different
labour market participation due to differences in labour demand or/and
equilibrium levels of employment.
As for the wage equation the econometric difficulties are numerous and
mostly related to self-selection (selectivity bias) problems or/and
endogeneity of variables. We will use the natural log of monthly net wages
as dependent variable by taking into consideration the lognormality of
wage distribution. We will run simple OLS as a base-line model and for
checking the impact and robustness of more sophisticated techniques.
A general selectivity-bias problem for wage equations detected, described
and corrected by Heckman (1979) is that observed wages do not correctly
12
reflect the actual wage-offer distribution on the labour market because
accepted (rejected) thus observed (unobserved) wage offers are not
random. More exactly we cannot observe the low-wage tail/portion of the
wage offer distribution since lower wage offers are systematically rejected.
Then if we use simple OLS in estimating wage equations we would have
overestimated coefficients. Heckman has shown that overestimation is
correlated with labour market participation probability and proposes a
selection correction variable the insertion of which into the wage equation
corrects for this selectivity bias and, at the same time, the test of
significance of the parameter estimate of this variable provides a statistical
test for the presence of the selectivity bias. Technically this means that first
we have to estimate a probit for participation probability and with the help
of the estimated probit model we can construct a selection correction
variable.4 Finally this new variable has to be inserted into the wage
equation as an explanatory variable  and the significance of its parameter
estimation means that the hypothesis of selectivity bias of such a form is
present.
In the earlier human capital/ability-bias literature the original Willis and
Rosen’s (1979) ability-bias corrected wage model, a slightly modified
version of the Heckman’s selectivity-bias model, seems to be tailored to
the needs of our data. Willis and Rosen argue that the observed highest
degree of education is correlated with the ability of individuals obtaining
the given degree therefore the estimation of returns to education will be
biased if we estimate the wage equation with OLS since the parameters
will reflect differences in ability among individuals, as well. In their
original model they analyse two highest degrees (high school and college)
and assume that less able individuals attend high school, whereas the more
able obtain college degrees and because more (less) able persons are more
(less) productive then persons with BA degree would have systematically
higher wage offers than persons with high school diploma due to ability
differences. Since high-school diploma holders are located in the low-wage
part of the wage offer distribution and college degree holders are in the
high-wage part, then it is possible to construct two selectivity-bias
correction variables – using the same logic and technique as Heckman –
considering that with OLS the coefficients of BA holders would be
overestimated and those of high school diploma holders underestimated
                                           
4 The value of the selection correction variable (m) for the jth observation is
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=jm , where Z the variable matrix used in probit estimation, β is the vector of
parameters estimated by probit, Φ standard normal cdf, ϕ  standard normal pdf.
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the returns to education, and run separate regressions for the two levels of
education and getting unbiased coefficients.
In recent human capital/unobserved ability/endogeneity literature the
instrumental variable technique is popular (Bedi and Gaston 1999,
Brunello and Miniaci 1999, Card 1998, Roope 1999). It can handle ability
and endogeneity biases due to unobserved ability, endogeneity of the
schooling decision and so on. Unfortunately no IV method can be applied
to our data for potentially endogenous variables has to be continuous
whereas our such variables (BA or MA degree, cost-priced or state-funded
places) are all dummies.
We have run several specifications for the Heckman’s selectivity-bias
model and all the parameter estimates for the selection correction variable
have proven significant at the usual level (p = 0,05). Thus, in addition to
the OLS, we will use wage equations with Heckman’s estimator and also
White’s robust standard errors in order to correct for heteroscedasticity
(White 1980).
We have also constructed selectivity correction variables in the spirit of the
Willis and Rosen’s model and run separate regressions for the two
education levels, but these equations have all failed to produce significant
parameter estimates for the selection correction variables therefore we will
omit these results from the analysis.
It should be noted that making use of OLS and Heckman’s estimators is
tantamount to not correcting directly for ability bias, although the
coefficient of Heckman’s selectivity bias correction variable might capture
an ability element as well, and the association of school types and labour
market success indicators might simultaneously reflect educational and
student quality.
As for our explanatory variables in the wage equations we will use almost
the same specifications as in simple and multinomial logits. The first
difference is that a working time variable (monthly hours) is inserted into
all equations so as to control for differences in wages due to differences in
hours of work. The second one is intended to measure the effect any firm-
specific training might have on wages: whether the respondent has
participated in firm-specific training or not (1 = participated, 0 = not
participated). In order to capture the effects private, church-run or cost-
priced education might have on wages our key independent variables will
be specified in three ways: a single cost-price dummy (Model 1); three
dummies for cost-priced students graduated from state-run, church-run and
private institutions (Model 2); five dummies variables, three for the three
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private institutions in the sample, and two for cost-priced students in
church- and state-run institutions, respectively (Model 3).
The other explanatory variables that might have an impact on wages are
level of education (BA or MA), in-school labour market experience, and
type of education. Holding an MA degree might mean higher level of
human capital resulted from longer education, in-school labour market
experience also produces higher level of human capital via its learning-by-
doing element (Light 2001). Types of education would absorb the effect
actual equilibrium states of the labour market with heterogeneous jobs and
workers would have on labour market success.
5. RESULTS
Table 1 presents significant (at the p = 0,05 level) coefficients of the key
independent variables (funding of education and types of institutions)  for
all estimated models (Tables A1 to A9 in Appendix display the full
estimation results).
The third column of the table contains three significant coefficients from
the three logit models we have run for employed versus non-employed
persons. The first coefficient shows that in general persons graduated from
cost-priced places become employed with higher probability than those
graduated from state-funded places. The second and third coefficients
show that this only holds true of  those who were cost-priced students at
state-run institutions. In sum, the probability (willingness/op-portunity) of
employment is higher for persons graduated from a cost-priced place at a
state-run institution than for those graduated from a state-funded place at a
state- or church-run institutions, whereas being a cost-priced student at a
church-run or a private institution produces the same employment
probability as being a state-funded student at a state- or church-run
institution. That means that stronger willingness to work or better work
opportunities are positively related to the covering of the full cost of higher
education only in the case of students at state-run institutions.
The fourth column of the table presents five significant coefficients from
the three multinomial logit models. Out of the three labour market states
(unemployed, full-time student, other inactive) included in the models the
estimations have produced significant coefficients for only one status: full-
time student. That might be interpreted that funding of studies and type of
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institutions (state-, church-run, private) do not have any impact on the
probability of unemployment and being inactive (other than full-time
student). From Model 1 we can conclude that persons at cost-priced places
become full-time students after graduation with a lower probability than
those having studied at state-funded places. The results of Model 2 and 3
show, however, that this is not the case for private institutions, although
the chances of continuing higher education on a full-time basis are
significantly  worse for those who pay the full costs of education either at
church- or state-run institution than for those having been at state funded
places of state- or church-run institutions. State funded places thus provide
less willingness to finish studies than cost-priced places at both state- and
church-run institutions.
The results are clear. First, in terms of labour market success of the young
graduates the quality of education might not differ at cost-priced and state-
funded places or at state-run, church-run and private institutions as both
ways of funding education and all types of institutions are associated with
the same probability of unemployment. Second, private institutions, where
all the students cover the full cost of education, do not exhibit any patterns
different from either cost-priced or state funded places at state- or church-
run institutions. Third, cost-priced students at state-run institutions are
more likely to become employed and less likely to continue their studies on
a full-time basis than students at state-funded places, and cost-priced
students at church-run institutions are also less likely to remain students
than those at state-funded places. This can be interpreted as a life-cycle
returns to human capital investment effect. Since cost-priced students
cover the full costs of education they are more likely to enter the labour
market or enter the labour market earlier in order to collect the premia for
their extra investment, and this would result in higher probability of
employment and lower probability of remaining student.
Whether this extra investment would lead to higher wage premia, or
whether cost-priced or private education are of poor quality and therefore
persons graduated from cost-priced places and/or private institutions
would earn less has been the focus of our wage equations. In general the
answer is negative for both eventualities. The last two columns of Table 1
shows that most of the coefficients have been non-significant for both the
OLS and the Heckman models. Model 1 and 2 have solely produced non-
significant parameter estimations. This means that the wage of a cost-
priced student does not differ from that of a state-funded one (Model 1), in
addition the outcome is similar if we distinguish cost-priced students by
institutions (church-, state-run or private) (Model 2). These results are
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partly in line with those from Model 3: a person who studied at a cost-
priced place at church- state-run institutions attains – ceteris paribus – the
same level of remuneration as another person graduated from a state-
funded place does. From Model 3, however, we have significant parameter
estimates for all the three private institutions. These coefficients are all
significant and essentially of the same magnitude for the OLS and
Heckman model, implying that using OLS would not produce heavily
biased results. Moreover, the parameters display striking intra-group
differences among private institutions. A worker graduated from Dénes
Gábor College earns about 14 per cent less than an ex-student graduated
from a state-funded place at a state-run institution, whereas with the
diploma isssued by Janos Kodolanyi College and School of Modern
Business considerable wage premia can be obtained: 33 and 42 per cent,
respectively. This shows the heterogeneity of the quality of education
provided by the newly-founded private institutions and it is in line with our
rudimentary model of Section 3 about wages and admission criteria. As
regards Denes Gabor College the scores of admission were much lower (73
points) and the ratio of persons admitted to those applied was much higher
(49 per cent) in 1999 than the average values for private institutions (92
points and 29 per cent, respectively), whereas the same indicators display
stricter admission criteria in terms of both admission scores and admitted
to applied ratio for the other two institutions.5 It is worth noting, however,
that differences in admission criteria might lead to differences in ability of
students therefore interinstitutional wage differences might reflect not only
differences in education quality of institutions but also differences in
students’ ability.
We can conclude that in terms of returns to schooling, measured by the
wages of  young graduates, cost-priced and state-funded higher education
does not differ, thus education at cost-priced and state funded places
provides essentially the same level of knowledge or produces the same
educational quality. This only holds if we assume that the ability
composition of students is similar. We could not handle this problem but
since admission criteria to state-funded or cost-priced places reflect similar
requirements there is no sign that selection on the part of institutions
would result in differences in students’ quality. Self-selection of students is
also a problem but it may be that this takes place via choosing types of
education and in our models this potential effect is captured by type of
education dummies. Ability composition putting aside, although the
opportunity of establishing more and more cost-priced places might have
                                           
5 Source of data: National Admission Office Data Base
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been advantageous for higher education institutions so as to increase their
revenues they have shown some self-restraint and it seems that the increase
in cost-priced places did not lead to lower quality workers. We have
detected no differences in wages between private institutions and state-
funded places at state- and church-run institutions, that is the newly
founded higher education institutions in general do not have a negative
impact on the quality of workers via education of poor quality. Private
institutions, however, are heterogeneous in this sense. Out of the three
institutions in our sample one provides low quality education and/or less
able workers, the students of the other two, however, earn much more than
a typical person graduated from state-funded places. This is consistent with
a model where stricter/less strict admission requirements are coupled with
higher/lower student and education quality that leads to a more/less
productive workforce.
6.6. CONCLUSIONS
We have investigated the labour marker success of young higher-education
graduates in order to shed light on the potential negative effects the rapid
growth of the number of higher education students, the newly founded
private higher education institutions and/or the newly established cost-
priced places might have on their labour market position via increasing
labour supply and/or deteriorating student and educational quality.
We have seen that in terms of relative wages the position of young (20–34
year-old) workers with higher-education diploma does not exhibit a
downward wage pressure over the ’90s. Despite their increasing supply,
their wage premia have been increasing when comparing their wages to the
wages of workers of the same cohort with high school diploma.
There are some signs, however, that in the case of the newly established
cost-priced places and newly founded private higher education institutions
less strict admission criteria are applied; this is reflected in lower
admission scores and higher number of admitted to applied students ratio.
This might have led to lower quality students and education and therefore
to less productive potential workforce, and that would result in lower
employment and/or wage level among the young graduated from cost-
priced places and/or private institutions. We have analysed two types of
indicators (labour market status and wages) to see whether this is the case.
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As regards employment probabilities we have detected few differences
between cost-priced and state-funded students. The overall employment
probability of students graduated from cost-priced places is higher but a
more detailed analysis has shown that stronger willingness to work or
better work opportunities are positively related to the covering of the full
cost of higher education only in the case of students at state-run
institutions. As for unemployment cost-priced and state-funded places, and
state-, church-run and private institutions are associated with the same
probability, thus the quality of education (students) might not differ across
types of institutions and ways of funding. Finally, when examining the
probability of remaining a full-time student after graduation we have seen
that cost-priced students at state-run institutions are less likely to continue
their studies on a full-time basis than students at state-funded places, and
cost-priced students at church-run institutions are also less likely to remain
students than those at state-funded places. This can be interpreted as a life-
cycle returns to human capital investment effect. Since cost-priced students
cover the full costs of education they are more likely to enter the labour
market or enter the labour market earlier in order to collect the premia for
their extra investment, and this would result in lower probability of
remaining student.
As regards returns to schooling measured by wage level, it seems
education at cost-priced and state funded places provides essentially the
same level of knowledge or produces the same educational quality.
Although the opportunity of establishing more and more cost-priced places
might have been advantageous for higher education institutions so as to
increase their revenues they have shown some self-restraint and there is no
sign that the increase in cost-priced places has led to lower quality
workers. We have detected no differences in wages between private
institutions and state-funded places at state- and church-run institutions,
that is the newly founded higher education institutions in general do not
have a negative impact on the quality of workers via education of poor
quality. Private institutions, however, are heterogeneous in this sense. Out
of the three institutions in our sample one provides low quality education
and/or less able workers, the students of the other two, however, earn much
more than a typical person graduated from state-funded places. This is
consistent with a model where stricter/less strict admission requirements
are coupled with higher/lower student and education quality that leads to a
more/less productive workforce.
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8.FIGURE AND TABLE
Figure 1
Ratio of monthly wages of 20-34 year-old workers with higher
education to those with high-school diploma 1989–1998
Data: Employment Office Data Base
Table 1
Funding and institutions’ effects on labour market status and wages1
Labour market status Wages10
Employee2 Full-time student3 OLS Heckman
Model 1 Cost-price student 0,3244 -0,8387
Model 2 Cost-price students at
   chuch-run institution -31,8518
   state-run institution 0,3505 -0,9428
   private institution
Model 3 Cost-price students at
   chuch-run institution -32,8499
   state-run institution 0,3496 -0,9419
   private institutions:
Dénes Gábor College -0,189 -0,156
János Kodolányi College 0,267 0,287
School of Modern Business 0,324 0,353
Notes: 1 significant parameter estimates; 2 from logit models; 3 from multinomial logit
models; see 4 Table A1, 5 Table A2, 6 Table A3, 7 Table A4, 8 Table A5, 9 Table A6, 10 all
significant coefficients are from Table A9.
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9.APPENDIX
Tables A1-A9
Table A1
Probability of employment – Model 1
Variables Coef. z P>|z|
   Cost-priced student 0,324 2,82 0,005
   University graduate (MA) 0,012 0,16 0,873
   Paid work during study 0,442 5,09 0,000
 Type of education
   Agricultural -0,731 -5,15 0,000
   Humanities -0,400 -2,59 0,010
   Foreign Languages -0,603 -3,58 0,000
   Small Languages 0,072 0,11 0,915
   Physical Education 0,146 0,35 0,727
   Informatics -0,411 -2,13 0,034
   Technical -0,290 -2,05 0,040
   Arts -0,220 -0,62 0,534
   Medical 0,133 0,67 0,500
   Law 0,461 1,76 0,079
   Business&economics -0,264 -1,73 0,083
   Social Sciences 0,711 1,69 0,090
   Natural Sciences -0,888 -5,51 0,000
 Constant 1,519 13,67 0,000
 Number of obs 5757
 Wald chi2(16) 125,8
 Prob > chi2 0
 Pseudo R2 0,025
Logit, dependent variable: employee or self-employed
Reference: persons graduated from college (BA) at a non cost-priced place
with a specialisation in teaching and not having worked regularly during
study
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Table A2
Probability of employment – Model 2
Variables Coef. z P>|z|
Cost-price students at
   chuch-run institution 0,052 0,09 0,925
   state-run institution 0,350 2,73 0,006
   private institution 0,305 1,24 0,214
   Paid work during study 0,440 5,02 0,000
   University graduate (MA) 0,015 0,20 0,844
 Type of education
   Agricultural -0,734 -5,17 0,000
   Humanities -0,397 -2,57 0,010
   Foreign Languages -0,606 -3,59 0,000
   Small Languages 0,082 0,12 0,904
   Physical Education 0,143 0,34 0,732
   Informatics -0,408 -1,99 0,047
   Technical -0,294 -2,08 0,037
   Arts -0,223 -0,63 0,530
   Medical 0,129 0,65 0,513
   Law 0,458 1,75 0,081
   Business&economics -0,267 -1,74 0,082
   Social Sciences 0,717 1,70 0,088
   Natural Sciences -0,892 -5,53 0,000
 Constant 1,520 13,65 0,000
 Number of obs 5757
 Wald chi2(16) 127,1
 Prob > chi2 0
 Pseudo R2 0,025
Logit, dependent variable: employee or self-employed
Reference: persons graduated from state- or church-run college (BA) at a
non cost-priced place with a specialisation in teaching and not having
worked regularly during study
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Table A3
Probability of employment – Model 3
Coef. z P>|z|
Cost-price students at
   chuch-run institution 0,052 0,09 0,927
   state-run institution 0,349 2,73 0,006
  Dénes Gábor College 0,226 0,67 0,503
  János Kodolányi College 0,339 0,81 0,420
  School of Modern Business 0,530 0,84 0,398
   Paid work during study 0,444 5,02 0,000
   University graduate (MA) 0,015 0,19 0,848
 Type of education
   Agricultural -0,734 -5,17 0,000
   Humanities -0,398 -2,57 0,010
   Foreign Languages -0,607 -3,59 0,000
   Small Languages 0,082 0,12 0,904
   Physical Education 0,143 0,34 0,732
   Informatics -0,378 -1,73 0,084
   Technical -0,294 -2,08 0,037
   Arts -0,225 -0,63 0,527
   Medical 0,129 0,65 0,514
   Law 0,458 1,75 0,081
   Business&economics -0,274 -1,78 0,075
   Social Sciences 0,716 1,70 0,089
   Natural Sciences -0,892 -5,53 0,000
 Constant 1,519 13,64 0,000
 Number of obs 5757
 Wald chi2(16) 127,6
 Prob > chi2 0
 Pseudo R2 0,025
Logit, dependent variable: employee or self-employed
Reference: persons graduated from state- or church-run college (BA)
at a non cost-price place with a specialisation in teaching and not
having worked regularly during study
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Table A4
Determinants of Labour Market Status – Model 1
Labour Market Status Coef. z P>|z|
Unemployed
   Cost-price student -0,044 -0,23 0,815
   University graduate (MA) -0,431 -2,94 0,003
   Paid work during study -0,436 -2,65 0,008
 Type of education
   Agricultural 1,044 5,12 0,000
   Humanities 0,227 0,92 0,356
   Foreign Languages 0,195 0,69 0,490
   Small Languages 0,000 0,00 1,000
   Physical Education 0,195 0,34 0,736
   Informatics -0,272 -0,73 0,465
   Technical -0,045 -0,20 0,845
   Arts 0,292 0,54 0,589
   Medical -1,865 -3,03 0,002
   Law -0,871 -1,70 0,090
   Business&economics -0,487 -1,80 0,071
   Social Sciences -1,208 -1,62 0,105
   Natural Sciences 0,308 1,09 0,277
 Constant -2,412 -10,83 0,000
 Full-time Student
   Cost-price student -0,838 -3,70 0,000
   University graduate 0,067 0,59 0,553
   Paid work during study -0,663 -4,83 0,000
 Type of education
   Agricultural 1,259 4,09 0,000
   Humanities 0,990 3,17 0,002
   Foreign Language 1,662 5,34 0,000
   Small Languages -29,319 -77,20 0,000
   Physical Education 0,622 0,93 0,354
   Informatics 1,513 4,30 0,000
   Technical 1,032 3,44 0,001
   Arts 0,540 0,87 0,383
   Medical 0,444 1,21 0,226
   Law 0,281 0,66 0,510
   Business&economics 1,512 5,10 0,000
   Social Sciences -28,923 -98,64 0,000
   Natural Sciences 2,074 6,95 0,000
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Continued
 Constant -3,701 -12,33 0,000
 Other inactive
   Cost-price student 0,280 1,23 0,219
   University graduate 0,126 0,63 0,526
   Paid work during study 0,016 0,08 0,933
 Type of education
   Agricultural -1,520 -3,46 0,001
   Humanities -0,091 -0,32 0,752
   Foreign Language -0,409 -1,12 0,263
   Small Languages 0,714 0,82 0,411
   Physical Education -30,656 116,14 0,000
   Informatics -0,915 -1,89 0,059
   Technical -1,585 -4,11 0,000
   Arts -0,887 -1,30 0,193
   Medical 0,064 0,19 0,849
   Law -0,791 -1,54 0,124
   Business&economics -0,937 -2,79 0,005
   Social Sciences -0,819 -1,11 0,268
   Natural Sciences -0,628 -1,54 0,124
Constant -2,712 -9,20 0,000
  Number of obs 5210
  Wald chi2 89430,8
  Prob > chi2 0,000
  Pseudo R2 0,0603
Multinomial logit, dependent variable: labour market status,
reference outcome: employed or self-employed.
Reference: persons graduated from college (BA) at a non cost-price
place with a specialisation in teaching and not having worked
regularly during study
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Table A5
Determinants of Labour Market Status – Model 2
Labour Market Status Coef. z P>|z|
Unemployed
Cost-price students at
   chuch-run institution -0,086 -0,08 0,933
   state-run institution -0,193 -0,92 0,356
   private institution 0,398 0,96 0,338
   Paid work during study -0,446 -2,68 0,007
   University graduate (MA) -0,415 -2,80 0,005
 Type of education
  Agricultural 1,034 5,04 0,000
  Humanities 0,204 0,83 0,406
  Foreign Languages 0,157 0,56 0,576
  Small Languages -0,013 -0,01 0,990
  Physical Education 0,180 0,31 0,756
  Informatics -0,484 -1,17 0,242
  Technical -0,056 -0,24 0,809
  Arts 0,249 0,46 0,648
  Medical -1,881 -3,05 0,002
  Law -0,897 -1,75 0,081
  Business&economics -0,542 -1,91 0,056
  Social Sciences -1,220 -1,63 0,102
  Natural Sciences 0,291 1,02 0,306
Constant -2,386 -10,64 0,000
Full-time student
Cost-price students at
   chuch-run institution -31,851 -95,11 0,000
   state-run institution -0,942 -3,48 0,001
  private institution -0,408 -1,09 0,274
   Paid work during study -0,675 -4,88 0,000
   University graduate (MA) 0,089 0,78 0,435
 Type of education
  Agricultural 1,243 4,03 0,000
  Humanities 0,984 3,14 0,002
  Foreign Languages 1,642 5,26 0,000
  Small Languages -31,309 -81,68 0,000
  Physical Education 0,604 0,90 0,368
  Informatics 1,404 3,92 0,000
  Technical 1,016 3,38 0,001
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  Arts 0,511 0,82 0,411
  Medical 0,421 1,15 0,252
  Law 0,255 0,60 0,550
  Business&economics 1,479 4,97 0,000
  Social Sciences -30,907 -105,05 0,000
  Natural Sciences 2,052 6,87 0,000
Constant -3,679 -12,28 0,000
Other inactive
Cost-price students at
   chuch-run institution -0,470 -0,44 0,657
   state-run institution 0,385 1,56 0,118
  private institution -0,092 -0,18 0,860
   Paid work during study1 0,015 0,08 0,936
   University graduate (MA) 0,118 0,58 0,560
 Type of education
  Agricultural -1,519 -3,46 0,001
  Humanities -0,058 -0,20 0,841
  Foreign Languages -0,383 -1,04 0,299
  Small Languages 0,763 0,88 0,380
  Physical Education -32,645 -123,56 0,000
  Informatics -0,744 -1,80 0,071
  Technical -1,584 -4,11 0,000
  Arts -0,862 -1,26 0,208
  Medical 0,073 0,22 0,829
  Law -0,776 -1,50 0,133
  Business&economics -0,909 -2,64 0,008
  Social Sciences -0,791 -1,07 0,286
  Natural Sciences -0,619 -1,52 0,129
Constant -2,724 -9,19 0,000
N 5210
  Wald chi2 108244,2
  Prob > chi2 0,000
  Pseudo R2 0,061
Multinomial logit, dependent variable: labour market status, reference
outcome: employed or self-employed.
Reference: persons graduated from state- or church-run college (BA) at
a non cost-price place with a specialisation in teaching and not
having worked regularly during study.
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Table A6
Determinants of Labour Market Status – Model 3
Labour Market Status Coef. z P>|z|
Unemployed
Cost-price students at
   chuch-run institution -0,097 -0,09 0,926
   state-run institution -0,193 -0,92 0,358
   Dénes Gábor College 0,794 1,07 0,283
   János Kodolányi College -0,099 -0,13 0,893
   School of Modern Business 0,811 1,04 0,299
   Paid work during study -0,467 -2,77 0,006
   University graduate (MA) -0,417 -2,81 0,005
 Type of education
  Agricultural 1,033 5,04 0,000
  Humanities 0,215 0,88 0,377
  Foreign Languages 0,188 0,67 0,500
  Small Languages -0,011 -0,01 0,992
  Physical Education 0,179 0,31 0,756
  Informatics -0,690 -1,22 0,222
  Technical -0,055 -0,24 0,812
  Arts 0,284 0,52 0,602
  Medical -1,879 -3,05 0,002
  Law -0,896 -1,74 0,081
  Business&economics -0,537 -1,87 0,062
  Social Sciences -1,218 -1,63 0,103
  Natural Sciences 0,292 1,03 0,304
Constant -2,380 -10,60 0,000
Full-time student
Cost-price students at
   chuch-run institution -32,849 -98,05 0,000
   state-run institution -0,941 -3,48 0,001
  Dénes Gábor College -0,441 -0,77 0,440
  János Kodolányi College -0,210 -0,40 0,692
  School of Modern Business -1,167 -1,15 0,250
   Paid work during study -0,674 -4,77 0,000
   University graduate (MA) 0,090 0,78 0,432
 Type of education
  Agricultural 1,242 4,03 0,000
  Humanities 0,981 3,13 0,002
  Foreign Languages 1,637 5,23 0,000
  Small Languages -32,311 -84,27 0,000
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  Physical Education 0,604 0,90 0,368
  Informatics 1,404 3,89 0,000
  Technical 1,015 3,38 0,001
  Arts 0,506 0,81 0,416
  Medical 0,420 1,14 0,252
  Law 0,254 0,60 0,551
  Business&economics 1,482 4,98 0,000
  Social Sciences -31,908 108,44 0,000
  Natural Sciences 2,052 6,86 0,000
Constant -3,680 -12,28 0,000
Other inactive
Cost-price students at
   chuch-run institution -0,485 -0,46 0,647
   state-run institution 0,387 1,57 0,116
   Dénes Gábor College 0,926 1,25 0,210
   János Kodolányi College -32,855 121,60 0,000
   School of Modern Business -32,731 -86,58 0,000
   Paid work during study -0,030 -0,16 0,874
   University graduate (MA) 0,118 0,59 0,558
 Type of education
  Agricultural -1,521 -3,46 0,001
  Humanities -0,046 -0,16 0,874
  Foreign Languages -0,343 -0,93 0,350
  Small Languages 0,766 0,88 0,377
  Physical Education -33,648 127,40 0,000
  Informatics -1,248 -2,21 0,027
  Technical -1,582 -4,10 0,000
  Arts -0,816 -1,19 0,234
  Medical 0,074 0,22 0,826
  Law -0,777 -1,51 0,132
  Business&economics -0,845 -2,49 0,013
  Social Sciences -0,786 -1,06 0,289
  Natural Sciences -0,620 -1,52 0,128
Constant -2,717 -9,18 0,000
N 5210
  Wald chi2 143026,01
  Prob > chi2 0,000
  Pseudo R2 0,062
Multinomial logit, dependent variable: labour market status, reference
outcome: employed or self-employed.
Reference: persons graduated from state- or church-run college (BA) at
a non cost-price place with a specialisation in teaching and not
having worked regularly during study.
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Table A7
Wage Equations – Model 1
OLS Heckman
Coef. t P>|t| Coef. t P>|t|
Selection correction variable 0,314 2,54 0,011
Working time (monthly, hours) 0,001 6,18 0,000 0,001 6,16 0,000
   Cost-price student 0,011 0,47 0,640 0,019 0,79 0,431
University graduate (MA) 0,211 11,82 0,000 0,217 11,98 0,000
Participated in firm-specific
training
0,033 2,04 0,042 0,036 2,26 0,024
   Paid work during study 0,118 6,21 0,000 0,118 6,23 0,000
 Type of education
   Agricultural 0,242 8,46 0,000 0,177 4,63 0,000
  Humanities 0,082 2,82 0,005 0,052 1,68 0,092
  Foreign Languages 0,187 4,60 0,000 0,141 3,20 0,001
  Small Languages -0,123 -1,50 0,132 -0,124 -1,56 0,119
  Physical Education -0,160 -2,37 0,018 -0,158 -2,37 0,018
  Informatics 0,614 13,76 0,000 0,595 13,25 0,000
  Technical 0,469 18,51 0,000 0,445 16,14 0,000
  Arts -0,116 -0,96 0,338 -0,033 -0,22 0,829
  Medical -0,001 -0,02 0,984 0,003 0,08 0,936
  Law 0,171 4,27 0,000 0,189 4,69 0,000
  Business&economics 0,684 23,80 0,000 0,664 22,16 0,000
  Social Sciences 0,073 1,63 0,104 0,098 2,05 0,041
  Natural Sciences 0,058 1,66 0,098 -0,021 -0,47 0,639
Constant 3,445 137,18 0,000 3,355 81,95 0,000
 Number of obs 4037 4025
 F 99,85 97,98
 Prob > F 0 0
 R-squared 0,311 0,311
OLS and Heckman with White’s estimator (robust standard errors), dependent
variable natural log of monthly wage (net of taxes).
Reference: persons graduated from college (BA) at a non cost-price place with a
specialisation in teaching, not having worked regularly during study, and not
having participated in firm-specific training.
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Table A8
Wage Equations – Model 2
OLS Heckman
Coef. t P>|t| Coef. t P>|t|
Selection correction variable 0,338 2,78 0,005
Working time (monthly, hours) 0,001 6,16 0,000 0,001 6,15 0,000
Cost-price students at
   chuch-run institution 0,018 0,75 0,455 0,018 0,75 0,452
   state-run institution -0,097 -1,26 0,208 -0,071 -0,93 0,354
  private institution 0,035 0,54 0,589 0,066 1,01 0,313
University graduate (MA) 0,214 11,99 0,000 0,221 12,20 0,000
Participated in firm-specific
training
0,034 2,10 0,036 0,037 2,31 0,021
   Paid work during study 0,115 6,11 0,000 0,115 6,09 0,000
 Type of education
   Agricultural 0,240 8,38 0,000 0,170 4,48 0,000
  Humanities 0,082 2,84 0,004 0,048 1,60 0,109
  Foreign Languages 0,185 4,65 0,000 0,134 3,20 0,001
  Small Languages -0,118 -1,44 0,150 -0,121 -1,52 0,129
  Physical Education -0,162 -2,39 0,017 -0,160 -2,39 0,017
  Informatics 0,602 11,14 0,000 0,570 10,33 0,000
  Technical 0,467 18,45 0,000 0,440 16,08 0,000
  Arts -0,118 -0,97 0,332 -0,038 -0,25 0,802
  Medical -0,003 -0,09 0,924 0,000 -0,01 0,993
  Law 0,169 4,21 0,000 0,187 4,62 0,000
  Business&economics 0,680 23,39 0,000 0,657 21,62 0,000
  Social Sciences 0,077 1,70 0,090 0,102 2,12 0,034
  Natural Sciences 0,055 1,58 0,114 -0,030 -0,69 0,491
Constant 3,446 137,11 0,000 3,350 82,57 0,000
 Number of ob 4037 4025
 F 90,38 89,13
 Prob > F 0 0
 R-squared 0,311 0,311
OLS and Heckman with White’s estimator (robust standard errors), dependent
variable natural log of monthly wage (net of taxes).
Reference: persons graduated from state- or church-run college (BA) at a non cost-
price place with a specialisation in teaching, not having worked regularly during
study, and not having participated in firm-specific training.
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Table A9
Wage Equations – Model 3
OLS Heckman
Coef. t P>|t| Coef. t P>|t|
Selection correction variable 0,295 2,43 0,015
Working time (monthly, hours) 0,001 6,14 0,000 0,001 6,13 0,000
Cost-price students at
   chuch-run institution 0,018 0,73 0,468 0,018 0,73 0,465
   state-run institution -0,093 -1,21 0,225 -0,072 -0,93 0,352
  Dénes Gábor College -0,189 -2,51 0,012 -0,156 -2,05 0,040
  János Kodolányi College 0,267 2,16 0,031 0,287 2,31 0,021
  School of Modern Business 0,324 3,12 0,002 0,353 3,37 0,001
   University graduate (MA) 0,213 11,99 0,000 0,220 12,18 0,000
Participated in firm-specific
training
0,034 2,11 0,035 0,037 2,33 0,020
   Paid work during study 0,127 6,69 0,000 0,126 6,67 0,000
 Type of education
   Agricultural 0,241 8,44 0,000 0,180 4,74 0,000
  Humanities 0,080 2,80 0,005 0,050 1,68 0,094
  Foreign Languages 0,175 4,56 0,000 0,130 3,19 0,001
  Small Languages -0,119 -1,45 0,147 -0,122 -1,52 0,128
  Physical Education -0,163 -2,41 0,016 -0,162 -2,41 0,016
  Informatics 0,707 12,52 0,000 0,676 11,71 0,000
  Technical 0,467 18,50 0,000 0,443 16,21 0,000
  Arts -0,122 -1,00 0,318 -0,036 -0,23 0,815
  Medical -0,003 -0,08 0,935 -0,001 -0,02 0,982
  Law 0,169 4,23 0,000 0,185 4,57 0,000
  Business&economics 0,662 22,65 0,000 0,642 21,04 0,000
  Social Sciences 0,077 1,69 0,091 0,098 2,03 0,042
  Natural Sciences 0,056 1,59 0,112 -0,020 -0,45 0,656
Constant 3,445 138,16 0,000 3,361 83,02 0,000
 Number of obs 4037 4025
 F 83,81 82,81
 Prob > F 0 0
 R-squared 0,318 0,317
OLS and Heckman with White’s estimator (robust standard errors), dependent
variable natural log of monthly wage (net of taxes)
Reference: persons graduated from state- or church-run college (BA) at a non cost-
price place with a specialisation in teaching, not having worked regularly during
study, and not having participated in firm-specific training
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